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In this paper, we introduce private information into a market with search frictions
and evaluate the relative eﬃciency of two pricing mechanisms, price posting and
bargaining. Each seller chooses investment that determines the quality of the good.
This quality is the seller’s private information before matching and it will be observed
in a match. Sellers enter a search market competitively and can choose either to post
prices or to bargain. In this environment, a pricing mechanism aﬀects eﬃciency
through the choice of quality and the number of trades. Bargaining induces the
eﬃcient choice of quality but an ineﬃcient number of trades because the division
of the match surplus is generically ineﬃcient. By directing buyers’ search, posted
prices internalize search externalities and induce the constrained eﬃcient outcome
in the case of public information. However, when the quality is private information,
this role of posted prices in directing search can conﬂict with their role in signaling
quality. Focusing on this conﬂict, we ﬁnd that bargaining could yield higher eﬃciency
than price posting. We characterize the parameter regions in which each of the two
mechanisms dominates in eﬃciency.
JEL classiﬁcations: D8, C78, E24.
Keywords: Directed search; Signaling; Bargaining; Eﬃciency.
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In this paper, we evaluate the relative eﬃciency of price posting versus bargaining in a
search market with private information. On one side of the market, each agent chooses
investment that determines the quality of the good. This quality is the agent’s private
information before matching and it will be observed in a match. Agents enter a search
market competitively and can choose either to post prices or to bargain. A posted price can
signal the quality of the good, as well as directing the search by agents on the other side of
the market. We characterize the equilibrium under the two pricing mechanisms separately,
compare their relative eﬃciency, and then make predictions about which mechanism will
arise in the market. We ﬁnd that with private information, bargaining can dominate price
posting in eﬃciency in a positively measured subset of parameter values, in contrast with
the public information case (Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999).
The market outlined above has features that are common to all “search goods”, whose
qualities are observed only after match.1 One example is the labor market, where ﬁrms
can create jobs that diﬀer in amenities and working conditions. Workers can ﬁnd out the
quality of a particular job only after visiting the ﬁrm. Another example is the market of
goods such as a piece of furniture. A seller can incur a cost to improve the quality of the
furniture, but buyers do not know the quality unless they visit the particular seller and
inspect the furniture. Let us refer to the agents who undertake the investment as “sellers”
and the agents on the other side of the market as “buyers”. Sellers can choose either to
post prices or bargain over prices. A posted price can signal the quality of the good.
The key insight of our analysis is that a pricing mechanism aﬀects eﬃciency in two
dimensions: the quality of goods and the number of trades. With bargaining, sellers al-
ways choose the eﬃcient quality: because a buyer will observe the quality of the good after
meeting a seller, it is optimal for the seller to choose the quality to maximize the joint sur-
plus of the match, regardless of the bargaining power. However, because bargained prices
do not direct buyers’ search, they produce generically ineﬃcient division of the matched
surplus between buyers and sellers. This ineﬃcient division leads to ineﬃcient entry of
sellers into the market and, hence, an ineﬃcient number of trades in the equilibrium. The
extent of this ineﬃciency under bargaining can be measured by the deviation from the
Hosios (1990) condition, i.e., by the diﬀerence between sellers’ bargaining power, denoted
σ, and the share of sellers’ contribution to matches. The entry of sellers is excessive when
1They contrast with the so-called “experience goods” whose qualities can be discovered only after
consumption, such as a cup of coﬀee.
1this diﬀerence is positive and deﬁcient when this diﬀerence is negative.
With price posting, in contrast, each seller can direct buyers’ search in the following
sense: by changing the posted price, the seller understands that he will aﬀect directly the
number of buyers whom he will attract and, hence, the probability of selling the good. This
directed nature of search endogenizes sellers’ share of the match surplus. When quality is
public information, this endogenous share satisﬁes the Hosios condition; that is, directed
search internalizes matching externalities and generates the eﬃcient division of the match
surplus. In this case, the amount of entry of sellers and the number of trades are eﬃcient.
When quality is private information, however, the ability of posted prices to direct search
may be compromised by the need to set prices to signal quality. This compromise can
generate either ineﬃcient entry of sellers and/or an ineﬃcient choice of quality.
A large part of this paper is devoted to the analysis of the signaling equilibrium under
price posting, since the equilibrium under bargaining is straightforward. Under reasonable
restrictions on buyers’ beliefs about sellers’ types, we show that there is a unique equilib-
rium, where all sellers in the market produce the same quality in the signaling equilibrium.
The quality level in the equilibrium and the extent of the potential ineﬃciency depend on
the ratio of low to high quality, denoted as ρ.
To evaluate the relative eﬃciency of the two pricing mechanisms, we use a social welfare
function which is deﬁned as the sum of expected match surpluses of all the agents in the
market. Because sellers make zero expected proﬁt under competitive entry, and because
agents are risk neutral, the social welfare function is equal to the sum of buyers’ expected
surpluses. The eﬃcient allocation requires that only high-quality goods be produced and
that the amount of entry of sellers be eﬃcient. When quality is public information, price
posting is eﬃcient and hence dominates bargaining for almost all parameter values, as in
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). When quality is private information, the relative eﬃciency
of the two pricing mechanisms depends on two parameter values: sellers’ bargaining power,
σ, and the relative quality of low-quality goods, ρ. For almost all values of (σ,ρ), the two
m e c h a n i s m sc a nb er a n k e di ne ﬃciency and only the mechanism with higher eﬃciency will
exist in the equilibrium.
The ranking, described below, is directly related to the two dimensions of eﬃciency
described above. When ρ is suﬃciently low, price posting can eﬃciently signal high-
quality investment and therefore dominates bargaining generically. When ρ is moderately
large, however, posted prices cannot fulﬁll both their search-directing and signaling roles:
prices must be below a certain level to direct search eﬃciently, but such prices would
be too low for high-quality sellers to signal their quality. This conﬂict between the two
2roles of posted prices generates ineﬃciency. In this case, the ranking in eﬃciency between
the two pricing mechanism can take one of the following forms: (i) price posting with
high quality still dominates, but with too much entry; (ii) price posting with low quality
dominates, resulting in too little entry and ineﬃcient quality; (iii) bargaining with eﬃcient
quality dominates, but with generically ineﬃcient entry. Thus, with private information,
bargaining dominates price posting when sellers’ bargaining power is close enough to the
Hosios condition and when the diﬀerence between low and high quality is small. Otherwise,
price posting dominates bargaining.
The two main ingredients in our analysis are directed search and signaling. Each
ingredient has been analyzed in the literature separately but not together. In the literature
on prices as signals of quality, either search frictions are absent (e.g., Wolinsky, 1983, and
Rogerson, 1988), or search is not directed (e.g., Bester, 1993). On the other hand, the
g r o w i n gl i t e r a t u r eo nd i r e c t e ds e a r c ho f t e no m its private information, e.g., Peters (1984,
1991), Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), and Burdett et al. (2001). Putting the
two ingredients together not only captures important features of realistic markets, but also
yields non-trivial comparisons between the two pricing mechanisms. For example, while
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that price posting dominates bargaining in eﬃciency
for almost all parameter values, we show that bargaining can dominate price posting for a
positively measured subset of parameter values.
A few recent papers have incorporated private information into models of directed
search. Analyzing the goods market, Peters and Severinov (1997) construct a model where
buyers have independent values of the goods and sellers use auctions to direct buyers’
participation. Forand (2007) analyzes a related problem where sellers compete by oﬀering
a probability with which buyers can realize the true valuation of the object after visiting
the seller. Guerrieri (2005), Menzio (2007), Michelacci and Suarez (2006), and Shimer
and Wright (2007) analyze directed search in the labor market with private information.
One main diﬀerence between all these papers and ours is that signaling through prices is
unimportant in these papers but critical in our analysis. In these papers, except Menzio
(2007), the agents who oﬀer pricing mechanisms do not have private information before
setting prices and so, signaling is irrelevant. Menzio (2007) allows ﬁrms to have private
information on the quality of the vacancies they want to ﬁll, but he excludes price signaling
by assuming that wages are determined ex post by Nash bargaining.
There are other speciﬁcd i ﬀerences between each of these papers and ours. Menzio
(2007) focuses on how ﬁrms can direct workers’ search by making cheap talks, i.e., pre-
match announcements that do not constitute any contractual obligation. Guerrieri (2005)
3focuses on dynamic ineﬃciency in the labor market which arises from the externality that
recruiting ﬁrms in one period generate on recruiting ﬁrms in the next period. In her model,
private information (in a worker’s disutility of working) is created after, rather than before,
a match is formed. Peters and Severinov (1997) and Forand (2007) examine auctions.
Shimer and Wright (2007) analyze a model with two-sided private information (worker’s
eﬀort and ﬁrm’s productivity), where ﬁrms can direct workers’ search by oﬀering contracts.
Again, ﬁrms do not know their productivity levels at the time of oﬀering contracts. In
common, these papers ﬁx one pricing mechanism and, hence, do not compare price posting
with bargaining. Michelacci and Suarez (2006) compare the two pricing mechanisms, but
their model is one of adverse selection rather than signaling. At the end of section 5, we
will compare their results with ours in detail.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we will describe
the environment of the economy. In section 3, we will assume that there is no private
information and analyze the eﬃcient allocation, the equilibrium under price posting, and
the equilibrium under bargaining. In section 4, we will analyze the equilibrium with price
posting under private information. Section 5 will compare the two pricing mechanisms in
eﬃciency. Section 6 will discuss related topics. We will conclude in section 7 and provide
necessary proofs in the Appendix.
2. The Model
To simplify the terminology, we will describe the market as one for goods, although it also
captures some aspects of the labor market. The economy has one period. There are a large
number of identical buyers, whose mass is normalized to 1. Each buyer wants to consume
one unit of good. The utility of consumption is equal to the quality of the good, denoted
k. There are also a large number of potential sellers. The number of active sellers in the
market per buyer, denoted n, is endogenously determined by competitive entry. Refer to
n as the economy-wide tightness of the market. A seller must produce the good when
entering the market. The cost of a good of quality k is ψ(k), where ψ(0) > 0, ψ0 > 0a n d
ψ00 < 0. The assumption ψ(0) > 0 is intended to capture the cost of entering the market.
The quality of the good is the seller’s private information before a match. However,
after meeting the seller, a buyer observes the quality of the good immediately. Thus,
we focus on “search goods” and abstract from “experience goods”. As in the literature
(e.g., Bester, 1993), this abstraction enables us to focus on the interaction between search
frictions and pricing mechanisms.
4To simplify the analysis, let k ∈ {kH,k L},w h e r ekH =1a n dkL = ρ ∈ (0,1).2 Label the
goods with quality kH as high-quality goods and the goods with quality kL as low-quality
goods. The sellers producing these goods are called high-quality sellers and low-quality
sellers, respectively. Denote the average cost of quality as a(k)=ψ(k)/k.W em a i n t a i n
the following assumption:
Assumption 1. (i) a(k) < 1 for all k ≤ 1;( i i )a0(k) < 0 for all k ≤ 1.
With part (i) of this assumption, a good of quality k c a nb ep r o d u c e di nap r i c ep o s t i n g
equilibrium. Part (ii) ensures that producing a high-quality good is always more eﬃcient
than producing a low-quality good if the quality is public information. Thus, if low-quality
goods are produced in an equilibrium, it is an ineﬃciency generated by private information.
The goods market has two submarkets and agents can choose which one to participate
in. In one submarket, sellers post prices; in the other, prices are determined by bargaining.
At the beginning of the period, potential sellers choose whether to enter a particular
submarket. Upon entering, a seller chooses a quality level and produces the goods. In
the submarket with price posting, each seller must post and commit to a price when
entering the submarket. After observing all posted prices and the measure of sellers in
each submarket, buyers choose which submarket to enter. Each buyer can choose to visit
at most one seller.3 After matching, a seller randomly chooses one of the visiting buyers
to trade with at the posted price. In the submarket with bargaining, buyers and sellers
are randomly matched in pairs and, in each match, the two agents trade at a price that is
determined by generalized Nash bargaining. After trade, buyers consume and the economy
ends. The value of an unsold good is zero.
In both submarkets, search frictions can be described by the matching probabilities.
Let q denote the queue length of buyers at a particular seller, i.e., the expected number of
buyers whom the seller will receive. Assume that a buyer’s matching probability is F(q)
and a seller’s matching probability is qF(q). Search frictions are reﬂected by the feature
that these matching probabilities are less than one, which we will assume below.
2It is straightforward to extend our analysis to the economy where the set of k contains more than two
levels, provided that the set is discrete. However, the analysis will be signiﬁcantly more complicated if k
lies in an interval. In this case, the reﬁnement criterion that we will use in section 4 will not be suﬃcient to
produce a unique signaling equilibrium under price posting. Much stronger criteria, such as the universal
divinity, will be needed.
3The assumption that a buyer cannot visit two or more sellers simultaneously captures the fact that a
buyer cannot physically be at two stores at the same time. Because a buyer must visit a seller in order to
ﬁnd the quality of the seller’s good, the assumption is realistic.
5The two mechanisms diﬀer in two critical aspects. First, posted prices cannot directly be
a function of the quality of the good in a match but bargained prices can. This assumption
is common in the literature (e.g., Bester, 1993, and Michelacci and Suarez, 2006), and it
is necessary for the two mechanisms to potentially induce diﬀerent choices of quality. A
justiﬁcation for the assumption is that it is diﬃcult for a third party to verify the quality
of the good, and so a posted price as a function of the quality cannot be enforced.
Second, posted prices can direct buyers’ search but bargained prices cannot. With
price posting, a seller anticipates that he can aﬀect buyers’ search decisions by changing
the price and, thereby, aﬀect the number of buyers visiting him. In this case, each seller
regards q as a function of the price he posts, which will be derived later.4 In contrast, with
bargaining, each seller takes q as given because changes in a bargained price cannot aﬀect
the probability with which that match is formed. In this case, the queue length for each
seller is equal to the economy-wide tightness of the market, which is 1/n. To emphasize
this feature, we sometimes write q under bargaining as Q.
The matching probabilities above imply that the matching technology has constant
returns to scale, because the probabilities depend only on the queue length. In addition,
we require the matching technology to satisfy the following standard assumption:
Assumption 2. (i) F(q), qF(q) ∈ [0,1] for all q, limq→0 F(q) = limq→+∞ qF(q)=1and
limq→+∞ F(q)=l i m q→0 qF(q)=0; (ii) F0 ≤ 0, F + qF0 ≥ 0; (iii) qF00 ≤− 2F0;a n d( i v )
limq→+∞ q[F(q)+qF0(q)] = 0. All the inequalities are strict if F(q) and qF(q) lie in the
interior of (0,1).
Part (i) of this assumption is evident. Part (ii) requires that the matching probability
should decrease for a buyer and increase for a seller as the number of buyers per seller
increases. Part (iii) requires a seller’s matching probability to be a concave function of q.
Part (iv) is required for existence of a solution to the canonical price posting equilibrium.
Part (ii) of the above assumption implies non-trivial trade-oﬀs between prices and
matching probabilities under price posting. When a seller posts a price higher than others’,
he should expect that fewer buyers will visit him and, hence, his matching probability will
be lower. However, if he gets a match, he sells the good for a higher price. Conversely,
when a seller posts a price lower than others, he should expect an increase in the matching
4We assume that the function F (.) is exogenous, as in the formulations of directed search by Moen
(1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). Some other models of directed search derive the function F from
the strategic game among a ﬁnite number of agents and then take the limit when the number of agents
goes to inﬁnity (e.g., Peters, 1991, and Burdett et al., 2001). This diﬀerence in the modelling is not very
important for the main results of our analysis.
6probability, at the cost of a lower ex post proﬁt. Similarly, buyers face the trade-oﬀ between
price and the matching probability. These trade-oﬀs do not exist under bargaining.
The following well-known matching functions satisfy the above assumption:
Example 2.1. One example of the matching function is the so-called urn-ball matching
function, which yields F(q)=( 1− e−q)/q. This matching technology can be derived from
micro-foundations (Burdett et al., 2001) and satisﬁes all conditions in Assumption 2. An-
other example is the CES matching function, which yields F(q)=F0
h
λ +( 1− λ)q−θ
i1/θ
,
where λ ∈ (0,1) and F0 > 0. Truncate the function and restrict F0 suitably to satisfy (i)
of Assumption 2. The function also satisﬁes (ii) and (iii) of the assumption. Part (iv) of
the assumption is satisﬁed when θ < 0.
3. The Economy with Public Information
Assuming that quality is public information in this section, we characterize the eﬃcient allo-
cation, the equilibrium with price posting, and the equilibrium with bargaining. Through-
out this paper, we focus on equilibria that are symmetric in the sense that all buyers make
the same decisions, including their responses to a seller’s deviation. Then, we compare the
two pricing mechanisms in eﬃciency.
3.1. Eﬃcient Allocation under Public Information
Let us ﬁrst examine the socially eﬃcient allocation under public information. This will
p r o v i d ear e f e r e n c ep o i n tt ow h i c hw ec o m p a r et h ee ﬃciency levels of the two pricing
mechanisms. For this purpose, imagine that a social planner faces the same search frictions
as the market does. An implication of this restriction is that the planner must treat
symmetrically all buyers and all sellers with the same quality. Such symmetric allocations
require that q =1 /n. The social planner maximizes a social welfare function, which is
deﬁned as the sum of net values in the economy. Because the sum of expected utility of
buyers’ is F(q)k and the sum of production costs is nψ(k), where n =1 /q is the measure





Price does not enter here because it is a transfer between agents. The social planner’s
choices are the quality of goods, k, and the tightness of the market, q (or equivalently, n).
7Under the maintained assumptions on F (.), the welfare function has a single peak in





Because the left-hand side is an increasing function under part (iii) of Assumption 2, the
solution to the equation is unique, if it exists. Existence is ensured under Assumptions 1
and 2.5 Then, part (ii) of Assumption 1 implies that the function W (k,q∗ (k)) is increasing
in k for all k ≤ 1( =kH). Thus, the eﬃcient choice of quality is k =1 .
To simplify notation, let us denote q∗
H = q∗ (1) and q∗
L = q∗ (ρ). Note that part (ii)
of Assumption 1 and part (iii) of Assumption 2 imply that q∗
H <q ∗
L. We summarize the
above results as follows:
Lemma 3.1. Under public information, the eﬃcient allocation is k =1and q = q∗
H.
The eﬃcient allocation requires both that all goods have high quality and that the
number of sellers be eﬃcient. In turn, eﬃciency of sellers’ entry requires a particular price
if every seller makes zero net expected proﬁt, i.e., a particular level of transfer from a buyer
to a seller upon selling the good. For any given quality k,d e n o t et h i se ﬃcient price level
as p∗ (k). Because net expected proﬁt of a seller who sells a good of quality k at price p is




q∗ (k)F (q∗ (k))
. (3.3)
Because the eﬃcient quality is kH =1 ,t h ee ﬃcient price is p∗ (1). Denote p∗
H = p∗ (1) and
p∗
L = p∗ (ρ). It can be shown that p∗
H >p ∗
L.
To interpret the eﬃcient price more clearly, let us rewrite it as p∗
H = γ,w h e r e
γ ≡ G(q
∗




Then, the eﬃcient price satisﬁes the so-called Hosios (1990) condition, which requires the
share of the match surplus given to one side of the market should be equal to that side’s
share of contribution to the number of matches. To see that the above price satisﬁes this
condition, note that G(q) is sellers’ share of contribution to matches.6 The surplus in a
5From part (ii) of Assumption 2, we know that 0 ≤− q2F0(q) ≤ qF(q)s ot h a tl i m q→0[−q2F0(q)] = 0.
Part (iv) ensures that limq→+∞[−q2F0(q)] = 1.
6The total number of matches is nqF(q)=F(q), since n =1 /q. Sellers’ share of contribution to
m a t c h e si sd e ﬁned as dlnF(q)/dln(n), which is equal to G(q).
8match of quality k is k (because the cost of production is already sunk at the time of a
match), of which the seller gets a share p/k. The above price equates this share to the
sellers’ share of contribution to matches.







In the next two subsections, we will ﬁrst examine each submarket separately by shut-
ting down the other submarket. Then we will allow agents to choose between the two
submarkets and brieﬂy describe the equilibrium outcome in section 3.4.
3.2. Equilibrium with Bargaining
Suppose that the submarket with bargaining is the only market. The equilibrium outcome
is the same regardless of whether the quality of a good is private or public information.
This is because a buyer in a match observes the quality of the good before bargaining.
Given the quality, k, and the price, p, the buyer’s surplus is (k−p) and the seller’s surplus
is p. Clearly, for a trade to take place, it is necessary that p ∈ [0,k]. Assume that the






The solution is p = σk and the expected value to the seller is J(k)=σQF(Q)k.
At the entry stage, the seller chooses k ∈ {ρ,1} to maximize net expected proﬁt π(k)=
J(k) − ψ(k), taking Q as given. In equilibrium, Q is such that π(k) = 0. Note that
J(k) ≤ σk, because QF (Q) ≤ 1 is a seller’s matching probability. If σ ≤ a(1), then
J(k) < ψ(k) for all such Q that QF (Q) < 1. In this case, no seller will enter the market,
because an entrant makes negative expected proﬁt. If σ >a(1) and if all sellers enter the
market with high-quality goods, then competitive entry determines Q as follows:
QF(Q)=a(1)/σ. (3.6)
The solution for Q to this equation, the quality choice k = 1, and the price level p = σk
form the unique equilibrium under bargaining. To see this, ﬁr s tn o t et h a tt h i so u t c o m ei s
an equilibrium. That is, if all other sellers choose the high quality, then an individual seller
will make a loss by deviating to the low quality. Net expected proﬁt from such a deviation
is π(ρ)=J (ρ) − ψ(ρ); substituting J (ρ)=σQF (Q)ρ and QF (Q)=a(1)/σ yields
π(ρ)=ρ[a(1) − a(ρ)] < 0, where the inequality follows from part (ii) of Assumption 1.
9Similarly, there is no other equilibrium. That is, if there were any sellers in the market
that oﬀer low-quality goods and make zero net expected proﬁt, then a seller would proﬁt
by deviating to the high-quality good.7
Therefore, bargaining generates the eﬃcient quality, provided σ >a(1). However, the
equilibrium level of sellers’ entry is ineﬃcient for all σ 6= γ. This is evident from comparing
(3.6) with the counterpart in the eﬃcient allocation, (3.5). Because the function qF(q)i s
an increasing function, the comparison reveals that Q<q ∗
H if and only if σ > γ.B e c a u s e
the measure of active sellers in the market is n =1 /Q, then the equilibrium with bargaining
has excessive entry of sellers if σ > γ and deﬁcient entry if σ < γ.
3.3. Price Posting with Public Information
Now suppose that the submarket with price posting is the only market and that the quality
of a good is public information. A seller chooses k and p simultaneously when entering
the market. However, because quality is public information, the choice problem can be
divided into two problems. The ﬁrst problem is to choose a posted price given the choice
of quality, and the second problem is to choose quality. For any given quality k,t h ep r i c e
posting decision solves the following maximization problem:
J(k)= m a x
p∈[0,k], q
qF(q)p s.t. F(q)(k − p) ≥ D.
Here, D ≥ 0i st h ee x p e c t e ds u r p l u st h a tab u y e rc a ng e ti nt h em a r k e t .S i n c et h em a r k e t
is large, each seller takes D as given (see Burdett et al., 2001, for a proof).
The constraint in the above problem is unique to directed search. It is necessary
because, if the constraint is violated, then the seller will not be able to attract buyers
at all. Moreover, the constraint must hold as equality in any equilibrium. To see this,
suppose that the constraint holds as strict inequality; that is, a buyer obtains a strictly
higher expected surplus from visiting the particular seller than from visiting any other
seller. Because every buyer can observe all sellers’ oﬀers, all buyers will strictly prefer
visiting the particular seller to any other seller. As a result, q →∞for the particular
seller. However, since F(∞) = 0 by assumption, a buyer who visits the particular seller
will obtain zero expected surplus. This contradicts the supposition because D ≥ 0.
7For the low-quality sellers to make zero net expected proﬁt, they must face a queue length ˆ Q that
satisﬁes ˆ QF( ˆ Q)=a(ρ)/σ.G i v e nˆ Q, a deviation to the high quality yields the following net expected
proﬁt: σ ˆ QF( ˆ Q) − ψ (1) = a(ρ) − a(1) > 0, where the inequality follows from part (ii) of Assumption 1.
10To emphasize the feature that a seller’s posted price directs buyers’ search, we rewrite
the equality form of the constraint in the above problem as follows:




where we suppressed the dependence of p on D.T h ef u n c t i o nP(q) can be viewed as the
demand function facing the particular seller.N o t e t h a t P (q) is a decreasing function,
because F(q) is decreasing. Thus, the higher the price posted by a seller, the smaller the
expected number of buyers who will visit the seller. When a seller chooses prices, he takes
into account this relationship between q and p. This feature is the deﬁning characteristic
of directed search.
Formally, we can substitute the function P (q) to write the seller’s problem as J(k)=
maxq [qF(q)P (q)]. The optimal choice yields:
p/k = G(q)a n dF(q)+qF
0(q)=D/k, (3.7)
where G is deﬁn e di n( 3 . 4 ) . 8 Let q(k,D)b et h es o l u t i o nf o rq to the second equation in
(3.7). The expected value for the seller is J(k,D)=−kq2F0(q), with q = q(k,D).
At the entry stage, each seller chooses k ∈ {ρ,1} to maximize π(k,D)=J(k,D)−ψ(k).
The optimal choice of k is a function of D,s a y ,k∗ (D). Then, determining an equilibrium
amounts to determining D by the condition for competitive entry: π(k∗ (D),D)=0 .
There is a unique equilibrium and the equilibrium allocation coincides with the eﬃcient
allocation. To establish these results, let us examine the dual problem of the above choice
of k, where each seller chooses k ∈ {ρ,1} to maximize D subject to the constraint that
π(k,D) ≥ 0. Competitive entry ensures π(k,D) = 0, which can be rewritten as (3.2).
Thus, q = q∗ (k). Substituting this function into (3.7), we can express D as a function of k
and verify that D is maximized by the choice k =1 . 9 Thus, there is a unique equilibrium,
where q = q∗
H, k =1a n dp = p∗
H = γ. This equilibrium allocation is the same as the
eﬃcient allocation. Therefore, price posting is more eﬃcient than bargaining for all σ 6= γ.
This is the result in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999).
3.4. Choice between the Two Submarkets
Now let agents choose between the two submarkets. In both submarkets, competitive entry
of sellers drives down a seller’s expected proﬁt to zero. Recall that buyers choose between
8Because G(q) ∈ [0,1] under part (ii) of Assumption 2, the above solution for p indeed satisﬁes the
constraint p ∈ [0,k].
9Substituting q = q∗ (k)a n dF0 (q∗ (k)) = −a(k)/[q∗ (k)]
2,w eh a v e :D = k[F (q∗ (k)) − a(k)/q∗ (k)].
This function increases in k under part (ii) of Assumption 1. Thus, D is maximized by the choice k =1 .
11the submarkets after observing posted prices and the measure of sellers in each submarket.
This timing of choices eliminates the possibility that sellers choose not to enter a submarket
simply because they expect that no buyer will enter the submarket. In particular, a seller in
the submarket with posted prices can always attract some buyers by posting a suﬃciently
low price, if it is optimal to do so. Thus, the only reason for a submarket to be missing
in the equilibrium is that it generates a lower expected surplus for buyers than does the
other submarket.
With zero expected proﬁt for sellers, buyers’ expected surplus in a submarket is equal
to the expected joint surplus in the submarket. That is, D = W (k,q)i ne a c hs u b m a r k e t .
The analysis in the previous two subsections shows that, for all σ 6= γ, the submarket with
posted prices generates strictly higher social welfare than the submarket with bargained
prices. We summarize the results so far in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2. If the quality of goods is public information, then the equilibrium under price
posting (and directed search) is socially eﬃcient. For all σ 6= γ, price posting dominates
bargaining in eﬃciency, and only the submarket with posted prices will exist. When σ = γ,
price posting and bargaining are both eﬃcient, in which case both submarkets exist.
4. Price Posting with Private Information
Because the equilibrium with bargaining does not depend on whether the quality of a good
is private information, we focus on the submarket with price posting in this section.
4.1. Beliefs and Payoﬀs
A seller may be able to signal the quality of his good by posting particular prices. To
describe such signaling, let μ(p,M) be the belief (probability) that buyers view a seller
who posts price p as a high-quality seller, given the distribution of prices posted by other
sellers, M. We will suppress M whenever there is no confusion. As before, let D be the
expected surplus that a buyer can get from the market. Let J (p,μ(p),D) be the expected
value for a seller who posts price p,g i v e nD and the belief μ. Then,
J (p,μ(p),D)=qF (q)p s.t. q satisﬁes:
F(q){μ(p)+[ 1− μ(p)]ρ − p} = D.
Here, the constraint holds as equality, as explained in section 3.3. Then, a seller’s decision
problem is as follows:
π(D,μ(.)) = max
(k,p)
[J (p,μ(p),D) − ψ(k)] s.t. p ∈ [0,k].
12Note that the seller chooses the quality and price at the same time, as we assumed in
the description of the environment. This assumption allows us to impose a particular
restriction on beliefs below.
Without restricting beliefs out of the equilibrium, the signaling game has many Bayesian
equilibria. For example, take any arbitrary price pa. Suppose that buyers have the following
belief: All sellers who post pa are high quality; if any seller posts p 6= pa, then the seller is
viewed as a low quality. With this belief, all sellers will indeed post only pa.I nt h i sc a s e ,
the belief that any seller who posts p 6= pa is a low-quality seller cannot be checked because
the event occurs with probability zero in the equilibrium. However, this particular belief
may not be “reasonable”. To reﬁne the set of equilibria, we need to impose restrictions on
beliefs out of the equilibrium.
One such restriction is the intuitive criterion by Cho and Kreps (QJE, 1987). To
illustrate it, take a supposed equilibrium as a reference point, where the sellers post price
pa. Consider a deviation from the supposed equilibrium: p0 6= pa. This deviation is a
credible signal for a type i seller if the following conditions are met: (i) p0 is feasible to a
type i seller; (ii) if buyers view a seller who deviates to p0 as type i, then the deviation
is proﬁtable for a type i seller; and (iii) even if buyers view a seller who deviates to p0 as
type i, the deviation is not proﬁtable for a type i0 seller, where i0 6= i.I no u rm o d e l ,t h e
intuitive criterion implies the following restrictions on beliefs:
Restriction 1. p ≥ ρ (= kL) implies μ(p) = 1; that is, if a seller posts p ≥ ρ,
then buyers should view the seller as a high type.
Restriction 2.I f t w o p r i c e s p1,p 2 ≥ ρ satisfy J (p1,1,D) >J(p2,1,D)f o r
given D, then a high-quality seller should prefer posting p1 to p2.
To see why the intuitive criterion implies Restriction 1, note that a buyer will see a
seller’s quality upon visiting the seller. If the good has low quality, the surplus to a buyer
is non-positive at price p ≥ ρ, and so the buyer will refuse to buy the good at such a price.
Thus, posting p ≥ ρ can never be optimal for a low-type seller, even if such a price may
(incorrectly) induce buyers to view the seller as a high type. In contrast, posting p ≥ ρ can
be optimal for a high-quality seller if such prices induce buyers to believe that the seller
has a high-quality good. Thus, the intuitive criterion requires that any seller who posts
such prices should be viewed as a high type.
Restriction 2 is a result of iterated use of the intuitive criterion. Consider any two prices
p1 and p2,w i t hp1,p 2 ≥ ρ,t h a ts a t i s f yJ(p1,1,D) >J(p2,1,D). Because both prices are at
13least ρ, Restriction 1 implies μ(p1)=μ(p2) = 1. Thus, if other sellers post p2, a particular
seller can deviate to p1 without inducing a change in buyers’ beliefs. Because posting p1
yields a higher expected value to the seller, such a deviation is proﬁtable.
Restriction 2 implies that, among all possible choices p ≥ ρ, a high-quality seller should
consider only the particular price that maximizes the expected value. From the analysis in
section 3.3, J (p,1,D) is maximized at the price level equal to G(q(1,D)), where q(k,D)
is deﬁned as the solution to the second equation in (3.7). When the level of D induces
zero net expected proﬁt for each seller, q(1,D)=q∗
H and G(q(1,D)) = γ,w h e r eq∗
H is
deﬁn e di n( 3 . 5 )a n dγ is deﬁn e di n( 3 . 4 ) .I fγ ≥ ρ, then Restriction 2 above implies that
high-quality sellers will post price γ and low-quality sellers will post the price p∗
L < ρ,
where p∗
L = p∗ (ρ)i sd e ﬁned by (3.3) with k = ρ.
However, it is possible that γ < ρ, in which case high-quality sellers cannot separate
themselves from low-quality sellers by posting price γ or any price p<ρ.I nt h i sc a s e ,w e
impose the following restriction:
Restriction 3: p<ρ implies μ(p)=0 .
To justify this restriction, note that the expected value for a seller, J (p,μ(p),D), does
not depend directly on the quality of the good, provided that k ≥ p. Thus, for any choice
p<ρ and any given μ(p)a n dD, a seller’s net proﬁts a t i s ﬁes:
J (p,μ(p),D) − ψ(ρ) >J(p,μ(p),D) − ψ(1).
Recall that a seller chooses both k and p when entering the market. The above inequality
implies that the choice (ρ,p) dominates the choice (1,p)f o ra l lp<ρ and all beliefs μ(p).
It is reasonable to eliminate the choice (1,p), where p<ρ, from a seller’s set of strategies.
Then, the only belief of buyers consistent with a seller’s choice p<ρ is μ(p)=0 .
4.2. The Equilibrium Regions
Under Restrictions 1 — 3, we can divide the analysis into two cases: γ ≥ ρ and γ < ρ.
Case 1: γ ≥ ρ. Because p∗
H = γ ≥ ρ >p ∗
L in this case, sellers of each type i post the
full-information price p∗
i,w h e r ei = H,L. Posted prices signal sellers’ quality and, hence,
separate the two types of sellers. Given this separation, it can be veriﬁed that entering
the market with a low-quality good is not optimal (for the same reasons as in section 3.3).
Therefore, all sellers in the market have high-quality goods and all post price γ.T h i s
equilibrium is the same as the one under public information, which is analyzed in section
3.3. Thus, private information does not generate any ineﬃciency in this case.
14Case 2: γ < ρ. In this case, posting price γ would induce buyers to view a high-quality
seller incorrectly as a low-quality seller (see Restriction 3). Private information generates
ineﬃciency, which can appear in two forms. The ﬁrst form is that prices are ineﬃciently
high as they are bounded below by ρ and, hence, there is excessive entry of sellers into the
market. Nevertheless, the market continues to provide the eﬃcient quality of goods. The
second form of ineﬃciency is that the quality of goods is ineﬃciently low in the market.
In the remainder of this section, we ﬁnd the conditions under which each of these two
subcases occurs. We organize the analysis along a series of results.
Result 1. Assume γ < ρ. If there is an equilibrium in which high-quality
sellers enter the market, then all high-quality sellers post price ρ.
Suppose, to the contrary, that some high-quality sellers in the market post pa > ρ and
make zero net expected proﬁt. We show that it is proﬁtable for a high-quality seller to
d e v i a t et oal o w e rp r i c e .L e tqa be the queue length of buyers for each of the sellers who
post pa,a n dDa be the expected surplus to a visiting buyer. Because (pa,q a)m u s td e l i v e r
Da to a visiting buyer, pa =1− Da/F (qa). The expected value to such a seller is:
J (pa,1,D a)=qaF (qa)pa = qa [F (qa) − Da].
Because the seller makes zero net expected proﬁt, then J (pa,1,D a)=a(1), which yields
Da = F (qa) − a(1)/qa. Substituting Da into the expression for pa, we can express the




; D0 = F (q0) −
a(1)
q0
= F(q0)(1 − ρ). (4.1)
Because [qF (q)] is an increasing function by Assumption 2, then pa > ρ if and only if
qa <q 0. Moreover, the hypothesis γ < ρ implies q0 <q ∗
H and Da <D 0.10
Now consider a high-quality seller who deviates to a lower price pb.T h i s p r i c e i s
constructed so that it attracts a queue length of buyers, q0, and that it delivers to each
visiting buyer the same expected surplus, Da, as other high-quality sellers do. These two
requirements determine pb as pb =1− Da/F (q0). Note that pb <p a because q0 >q a and
10To show q0 <q ∗





Because γ < ρ in Case 2 and [qF (q)] is an increasing function, then q0 <q ∗
H.T os h o wDa <D 0,n o t et h a t
the derivate of the function [F (q) − a(1)/q] with respect to q has the same sign as that of
£
a(1) + q2F0 (q)
¤
.
Because a(1) = −[q∗
H]
2 F0 (q∗




is a decreasing function by Assumption 2, then
a(1) + q2F0 (q) > 0 for all q<q ∗
H.S i n c eqa <q 0 <q ∗
H,t h e nDa <F(q0) − a(1)/q0 = D0.
15because F (q) is a decreasing function. Also, pb > ρ because Da <D 0. The expected value
for the deviating seller is: q0F (q0)pb = q0F (q0) − q0Da ≡ J (q0). We have:
J
0 (q0) >q 0F















The ﬁrst inequality follows from computing J0 (q0) and substituting Da <D 0, the equality
from substituting D0 from (4.1) and a(1) from (3.2), and the last inequality from q0 <q ∗
H.
Because J (q) is strictly concave, the above result implies that J0 (q) > 0f o ra l lq ≤ q0.
Then, qa <q 0 implies J (qa) <J(q0). That is, the deviation to pb is proﬁtable.
T h er e a s o nw h yt h ed e v i a t i o ni sp r o ﬁtable is that, when γ < ρ,p r i c e sa b o v eρ are
too high to be optimal. By reducing the price, a high-quality seller can increase the
queue length of buyers and the probability of selling the good. This higher probability
is more than compensating for the reduced price. Thus, the expected value to the seller
increases. Note that the price in the proﬁtable deviation, pb,i ss t i l la b o v eρ. Without
private information problems, a seller would want to set price below ρ in the current case.
In the presence of private information, however, reducing price below ρ would trigger buyers
to change beliefs about the seller’s quality from high-quality to low-quality. In this sense,
maintaining high beliefs acts as a constraint on the sellers’ problem.
T h ea b o v ea n a l y s i sa p p l i e sa sl o n ga ss o m e( not necessarily all) high-quality sellers
post prices above ρ.T h u s ,w h e nγ < ρ, no high-quality seller posts price above ρ in any
equilibrium. On the other hand, if pa = ρ in the above analysis, then qa = q0 and Da = D0.
In this case, a high-quality seller cannot reduce price further without triggering a change
in buyers’ beliefs. Therefore, Result 1 holds.
Result 1 describes high-quality sellers’ optimal choice of price conditional on their en-
tering the market. However, it is possible that a seller may not ﬁnd it optimal to produce
high-quality goods. To ﬁnd the condition under which an equilibrium with high-quality
goods exists, we examine the payoﬀ to an individual seller who chooses the low quality,
given that some other sellers will enter the market with high-quality goods, post price
ρ and make zero net expected proﬁt. By the above analysis, such a high-quality seller
attracts a queue length q0 of buyers and delivers the expected surplus D0 to a visiting
buyer. For the deviating seller who chooses the low quality, let p1 be this seller’s optimal
choice of posted price and q1 be the queue length of buyers for the seller. Clearly, p1 < ρ,
because this seller would not be able to sell the good by posting a price p ≥ ρ.U n d e r
Restriction 3 on beliefs, μ(p1) = 0 and so the expected value to the seller is J (p1,0,D 0).











The expected value to the seller is q1F(q1)p1 = −ρq2
1F0(q1). If this value is less than the
cost of the good, ψ(ρ), then entering the market with a low-quality good is not proﬁtable.





The following result describes not only existence, as established above, but also uniqueness
of the equilibrium with high-quality sellers (see Appendix A for a proof):
Result 2. Assume γ < ρ. If (4.3) holds, then there exists a unique equilibrium
in which all sellers have high quality and all post price ρ.
On the other hand, if (4.3) is reversed, then there exists a unique equilibrium in which
all sellers have low quality. In this equilibrium, a seller posts price p∗
L and attracts a queue
length of buyers q∗
L,w h e r ep∗
L and q∗
L = q∗ (ρ)a r ed e ﬁned in section 3.1. The expected
surplus to a visiting buyer is DL = ρ[F (q∗
L)+q∗
LF0 (q∗
L)]. The proof of existence and
uniqueness is a straightforward modiﬁcation of the proof of Result 2 and, hence, omitted.
Finally, there is a borderline case in which (4.3) is changed into equality. In this case,
both high-quality sellers and low-quality sellers enter the market. A high-quality seller
posts price ρ and attracts a queue length of buyers q0, while a low-quality seller posts p∗
L
and attracts a queue length of buyers q∗
L. Both types of sellers provide the same expected
surplus to a visiting buyer and make zero net expected proﬁt. The total measure of sellers
in the market and the composition of the two types of sellers are indeterminate in this
case.12 We ignore this borderline case.
The following theorem expresses (4.3) in a diﬀerent form and summarizes the above
results (see Appendix B for a proof):
11We assume that limq↓0 [F(q)+qF0(q)] >D 0/ρ, so that (4.2) has a solution. If this condition does not
hold, then for all pairs (p1,q 1), the maximum expected surplus which the deviating seller can generate to
a buyer is less than D0. In this case, the deviation is clearly not proﬁtable.
12If n is the total measure of sellers in the market and αH is the fraction of high-quality sellers, then n
and αH must ensure that the total measure of buyers visiting all the sellers should add up to the given
measure, 1. That is, n[αHq0 +( 1− αH)qL] = 1. Changes in n are oﬀs e tb yc h a n g e si nαH, and so neither
n nor αH is determinate.
17Theorem 4.1. Maintain Restrictions 1 — 3. There exists ρ0 ∈ (γ,1) such that (4.3) holds
iﬀ ρ ∈ (γ,ρ0). A unique equilibrium exists for all ρ 6= ρ0, as characterized in Table 1:












Case 1 0 ≤ ρ ≤ γ high γ q∗
H W (1,q∗
H)
Case 2A γ < ρ < ρ0 high ρ q0 (<q ∗
H) W (1,q 0)
Case 2B ρ0 < ρ ≤ 1 low p∗




As stated before, the equilibrium is eﬃcient in Case 1 but ineﬃcient in Cases 2A and
2B. Clearly, the quality of goods is eﬃcient in Case 2A but ineﬃcient in Case 2B. To check
how the amount of sellers’ entry is ineﬃcient in Cases 2A and 2B, note that there is only
one type of sellers in the market in each of the cases listed in Table 1. Thus, the measure
of sellers in the market is equal to 1/q.R e l a t i v et ot h ee ﬃcient amount of entry in Case 1,
the equilibrium has excessive entry in Case 2A and deﬁcient entry in Case 2B. The amount
of ineﬃciency in a particular case can be measured by the diﬀerence in a buyer’s surplus
between the particular case and Case 1. Note that a buyer’s surplus is equal to the level
of social welfare, as discussed in section 3.4.
5. Comparing Eﬃciency between Price Posting and Bargaining
We evaluate eﬃciency of price posting versus bargaining, using the social welfare function
W (k,q). There are two cases in which the comparison is simple. The ﬁrst is σ ≤ a(1). In
this case, price posting is evidently superior to bargaining, because the market shuts down
under bargaining. The second simple case is ρ ≤ γ (i.e., Case 1), where price posting is
eﬃcient and, hence, is superior to bargaining for all σ 6= γ. The following analysis assumes
σ >a(1) and focuses on the case ρ > γ. We organize the comparison according to Cases
2 Aa n d2 Bl i s t e di nT a b l e1 .
Case 2A: ρ ∈ (γ,ρ0). In this case, because price posting and bargaining both generate
the eﬃcient quality of goods, they diﬀer from each other only in the amount of entry of
sellers, i.e., in 1/q. Price posting yields q = q0 given by (4.1), while bargaining yields q = Q
given by (3.6). Because [qF (q)] is increasing, q0 <Qif and only if ρ > σ. To translate this
diﬀerence in the queue length into the diﬀerence in welfare, note that the welfare function
W (1,q)i si n c r e a s i n gi nq if and only if q<q ∗
H.B e c a u s e q0 <q ∗
H, entry is excessive in
the equilibrium under posted prices. Under bargaining, entry can be either excessive (if
σ > γ)o rd e ﬁcient (if σ < γ). Thus, we divide the analysis further into two subcases.
18(a) σ > γ and ρ ∈ (γ,ρ0). In this subcase, both price posting and bargaining generate
excessive entry; i.e., both q0 and Q are less than q∗
H. Thus, price posting yields higher
welfare than bargaining if and only if q0 >Qand, hence, if and only if ρ < σ. Therefore,
price posting is more eﬃcient than bargaining if γ < ρ < σ, while bargaining is more
eﬃcient if γ < σ < ρ.
(b) σ < γ and ρ ∈ (γ,ρ0). In this subcase, price posting generates excessive entry but
bargaining generates deﬁcient entry, i.e., q0 <q ∗
H <Q .T oc o m p a r ee ﬃciency between the
two mechanisms, let us deﬁne q3 by W(1,q 3)=W(1,q 0)w i t hW0(1,q 3) < 0. The level
q3 is the image of q0 on the other side of the hump of the welfare function, which has
deﬁcient entry rather than excessive entry of sellers.13 By construction of q3,p r i c ep o s t i n g
is more eﬃcient than bargaining if and only if W(1,q 3) >W(1,Q). Because both q3 and
Q are greater than q∗
H,t h e nW(1,q 3) >W (1,Q)i ﬀ q3 <Q . This condition is equivalent
to a(1)/σ >q 3F(q3). Using (4.1) to substitute for a(1), we can rewrite this condition as






























w h e r ew eh a v ee x p r e s s e dq0 and q3 as functions of ρ. Therefore, if σ <s (ρ)( < γ < ρ),
price posting is superior to bargaining; if s(ρ) < σ (< γ < ρ), bargaining is superior.
Case 2B: ρ ∈ (ρ0,1). In this case, price posting generates an ineﬃcient quality of
g o o d sa sw e l la sa ni n e ﬃcient amount of entry of sellers. The welfare level is W (ρ,q ∗
L).
Thus, price posting is more eﬃcient than bargaining if and only if W (ρ,q∗
L) >W(1,Q).
Taking into account the dependence of q∗
L on ρ,i tc a nb ev e r i ﬁed that W (ρ,q∗
L) is a strictly
increasing function of ρ.14 Thus, there exists R(σ) such that price posting generates higher
welfare than bargaining if and only if ρ >R (σ). The existence of the function R(σ)i s
ensured by the fact that W(ρ,q∗
L)|ρ=1 = W(1,q ∗
H) >W(1,Q).
13q3 is well deﬁned since W(1,q)i sd e c r e a s i n gt ot h er i g h to fq∗
H and W(1,q) → 0a sq → +∞.
14Since welfare is equal to buyer’s expected surplus, we can use the expression for D in (3.7) to compute
the welfare level at k = ρ and q = q∗






To obtain the second equality, we substituted F0 (q∗) from (3.2). Note that the partial derivative of the
above expression with respect to q∗




L). Then, we can verify that W(ρ,q∗
L(ρ)) is strictly increasing in ρ.
19To summarize the results, let us characterize an economy by the two parameters, (σ,ρ) ∈
[0,1]
2.D e ﬁne three sets of economies as follows:
B1={(σ,ρ):γ < ρ < ρ0,s (ρ) < σ < ρ, σ >a(1)},
B2={(σ,ρ):ρ0 < ρ <R(σ), σ >a(1)},
B3={(σ,ρ):σ = γ, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ γ}.
Let B = B1∪B2a n dl e tcl(B)b et h ec l o s u r eo fB in [0,1]
2. We summarize the comparison
in the following theorem (see Appendix C for a proof):
Theorem 5.1. Bargaining dominates price posting when the economy lies in B.O nt h e
other hand, price posting dominates bargaining when the economy lies outside B3∪cl(B).
The two pricing mechanisms have the same level of eﬃciency when the economy lies in B3
or on the boundary of B, the measure of which set in [0,1]
2 is zero. The boundaries of
B are determined by the functions s(ρ) and R(σ) which have the following properties: (i)
s0(ρ) < 0 and s(γ)=γ; (ii) R(σ) < 1 for all σ 6= γ, R(γ)=1 ,a n dR0 (σ) > 0 iﬀ σ < γ;
(iii) R(ρ0)=ρ0 and R(s(ρ0)) = ρ0.
Figure 1 depicts the set B as the interior of the shaded region, for the case where the
line σ = a( 1 )( n o td r a w n )l i e sb e l o ws(ρ0).15 The set B1 is the shaded region on the left
side of the vertical line ρ = ρ0, while B2 is the shaded region on the right side. The set
B3 is the segment of the line σ = γ between ρ =0a n dρ = γ. Note that the lower portion
of the curve ρ = R(σ) meets the curve σ = s(ρ)a tρ = ρ0. Similarly, the upper portion of
the curve ρ = R(σ) meets the line σ = ρ at ρ = ρ0.
Figure 1 oﬀers the following alternative way to express the relative eﬃciency of the
two pricing mechanisms. For each given ρ ∈ [0,1], deﬁne b(ρ)={σ ∈ [0,1 ]:( b(ρ),ρ) ∈
cl(B)}.T h e n ,b(ρ) is the set of values of sellers’ bargaining power with which bargaining
weakly dominates price posting for the given ρ. The correspondence b(.) is continuous. For
all ρ < γ, b(ρ)i se m p t y .A sρ increases above γ,t h es e tb(ρ)e n l a r g e sﬁrst for ρ < ρ0;t h a t
is, increases in ρ make it more and more likely that bargaining dominates price posting.
For ρ > ρ0, the opposite occurs. The economy with ρ = ρ0 oﬀers the highest chance for
bargaining to dominate price posting in eﬃciency.
To explain the non-monotonic feature of the set b(ρ), recall that ρ measures the gap
between high and low quality levels. An increase in ρ has no eﬀect on the equilibrium under
bargaining, but it has two opposite eﬀects on eﬃciency of price posting. First, it increases
15Recall that, when σ ≤ a(1), no equilibrium under bargaining exists and so price posting always
dominates bargaining. Thus, if the line σ = a(1) lies above s(ρ0), the lower part of the shaded region in
Figure 1 is cut oﬀ by the line σ = a(1).
20the diﬃculty of signaling high quality and, hence, increases ineﬃciency. Second, when the
quality of low-quality goods increases, the loss to buyers who consume low-quality goods
falls, which increases eﬃciency. For ρ < ρ0, only the ﬁrst eﬀect is present because the
market has only high-quality goods. For ρ > ρ0, only the second eﬀect is present because
the equilibrium involves no signaling. This is why the likelihood with which bargaining
dominates price posting increases with ρ for ρ < ρ0 and decreases with ρ for ρ > ρ0.
 σ
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Figure 1. Comparing eﬃciency between price posting and bargaining
Now we can analyze agents’ choices between the submarket with bargaining and the
submarket with price posting. As in section 3.4, only the submarket with a higher social
welfare level will exist in the equilibrium. Thus, when the economy lies in the interior
of B, only the submarket with bargained prices exists; when the economy lies outside
B3 ∪ cl(B), only the submarket with posted prices exists. The set of economies in which
the two submarkets coexist has measure zero.16
Let us compare the results in Theorem 5.1 with some others in the literature. First,
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) incorporate directed search but abstract from private infor-
mation. They show that bargaining can never dominate price posting in eﬃciency (see
16There is no systematic relationship between the mechanism that arises in the market and the price
level. This is because ineﬃciency in bargaining can arise from both excessive and deﬁcient entry of sellers.
21Lemma 3.2). Incorporating private information, our model shows that bargaining can
dominate price posting in a positively measured set of economies.
Second, Bester (1993) incorporates private information but abstracts from matching
entirely. He models the search cost by time discounting, as a buyer must take one period
to opt out from the described market to an outside good which has a uniform quality. To
compare our results with Bester’s requires us to set the discount factor to zero in Bester’s
model, because our model has one period and the payoﬀ to an agent from not trading is
zero. In this case, Bester’s model predicts that bargaining is superior to price posting if and
only if sellers’ bargaining power (σ) is small.17 In our model, bargaining is superior only
when σ is moderate; moreover, when ρ < γ, bargaining is inferior to price posting for all
σ 6= γ.T h e s ed i ﬀerences occur because the number of sellers is an important consideration
for eﬃciency in our model, but it is exogenous in Bester’s model.
Finally, Michelacci and Suarez (2006) compare price posting with bargaining in a di-
rected search model of the labor market. In their model, workers’ productivity is private
information. Firms can either post wages to direct workers’ search or participate in undi-
rected search and ex post bargaining. They show that the equilibrium can be pure posting,
pure bargaining or a mix of the two. In a positively measured subset of parameter values,
wage posting and bargaining can coexist, in which wage-posting ﬁrms are more likely to
attract low-productivity workers than do bargaining ﬁrms. On eﬃciency, they show that
pure posting generates higher welfare than bargaining. The coexistence of the two pricing
mechanisms and the unambiguous ranking of them in eﬃciency contrast sharply with our
results in Theorem 5.1 above. The main causes for these diﬀerences are as follows. First,
private information in our model lies on the side of the market that does pricing while,
in Michelacci and Suarez, it lies on the side of market that searches. Thus, our model
involves signaling while their model involves adverse selection. Second, in our model, the
total supply and the composition of agents (sellers) who have private information are de-
termined endogenously by competitive entry. In Michelacci and Suarez, these dimensions
are ﬁxed and, instead, competitive entry occurs on the side of the market that does not
have private information.
17By this result, we refer to Bester’s analysis on the set of stable pricing mechanisms, which is similar
to our analysis of agents’ choices between the two submarkets.
226. Discussion
In this section we discuss two assumptions of the model, their implications for the results,
and possible modiﬁcations. The ﬁrst assumption is that the cost of price posting is in-
dependent of the number of sellers who enter the price-posting submarket. The second
assumption is that the good is a pure search good.
The above assumption on the cost of price posting is responsible for the result that
price posting and bargaining do not coexist generically. The intuition is that, if the two
mechanisms coexist, competitive free entry requires that sellers be indiﬀerent between the
two mechanisms; at the same time, buyers must obtain the same expected surplus from
the two mechanisms. Generically, these two indiﬀerence conditions cannot hold simultane-
ously when the entry cost into a submarket is independent of the number of sellers in the
submarket. However, in certain markets, the cost of entry may depend on the number of
sellers in the market. For example, if price posting is associated with advertising, the cost
of price posting is likely to increase with the number of sellers who choose to advertise. To
incorporate this realistic feature, let α ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of sellers who post prices. Let
c(α) be the cost which a seller must incur in addition to ψ when entering the price-posting
submarket, with c(0) = 0, c(1) = ∞ and c0 (α) > 0. We sketch below how this structure
of entry cost allows for the coexistence of the two mechanisms.
To simplify the illustration, we consider only the case where the quality of the good
is public information, but we will comment on how our main results would continue to
hold under private information. Add a subscript a to the variables in the price posting (or
advertising) submarket and a subscript −a to the variables in the bargaining submarket.
If a seller enters the price-posting submarket, he will choose price pa and the implied
queue size qa according to (3.7), which are functions of (ka,D). The expected value to this
seller is Ja(ka,D)=−kaq2
aF0(qa), and the optimal investment ka maximizes Ja(ka,D) −
ψ(ka). If a seller enters the bargaining submarket, he will choose p−a = σk−a, which will
generate J−a = σQ−aF(Q−a)k−a (see section 3.2). Use the buyer’s participation constraint,
(1 − σ)k−aF(Q−a)=D,t oe x p r e s sQ−a and J−a as a function of (k−a,D). Optimal






∈ (0,1), if Ja(ka,D) − ψ(ka) − c(α)=J−a(k−a,D) − ψ(k−a),
=0 , if Ja(ka,D) − ψ(ka) − c(α) <J −a(k−a,D) − ψ(k−a),
=1 , if Ja(ka,D) − ψ(ka) − c(α) >J −a(k−a,D) − ψ(k−a).
In equilibrium, aggregation requires that αqa +(1−α)Q−a =1 /n, and free entry of sellers
23requires that the maximum of net expected proﬁt in the two submarket be zero. Similar
to the analysis in sections 3.2 and 3.3, it can be shown that ka = k−a =1 .
We can now address the issue of coexistence. For both submarkets to be active, it must
be that sellers be indiﬀerent between entering each submarket and that free entry drives
net proﬁts to zero. Thus,
Ja(1,D) − ψ(1) − c(α)=0=J−a(1,D) − ψ(1).
If c(α) is constant, the above two equations cannot generically be satisﬁed with the only
variable, D, and so only one mechanism will exist in the equilibrium. However, if c0(α) > 0,
there can be values of (D,α) that satisfy the above equations, in which case the two
mechanisms co-exist.18
Even with advertising costs, our main conclusion that bargaining may dominate price
posting with private information still holds true. This is because bargaining is superior
to price posting in regions where the search-directing and signaling roles of posted prices
conﬂict. In these regions, price posting involves either (i) eﬃcient investment, but excessive
entry (case 2A), or (ii) ineﬃcient investment and insuﬃcient entry (case 2B). Bargaining on
the other hand always features eﬃcient investment, so that if the economy is close enough
to the Hosios condition for eﬃcient entry, bargaining dominates. Adding advertising costs
can only increase the parameter region where this occurs.
Next, let us turn to the assumption that the good is a pure search good. This assump-
tion can be relaxed by allowing for uncertain outcomes of a seller’s investment and for buy-
ers’ signals. The details are as follows. At the beginning of the period, each seller chooses
an amount of investment, m, in the good’s quality. The outcome of the investment is a
random variable distributed over {1,ρ} according to the distribution prob(k =1 )=φ(m),
where φ0(m) > 0. Buyers observe each seller’s investment but not the quality of the seller’s
good. Thus, before visiting a seller who invested m and posted price p,ab u y e rf o r m sap r i o r
belief, μ(p,m), on the quality of the good and decides whether to visit the seller. Once at
the store, a buyer receives a signal about the quality of the good, z ∈ {ρ,1}, which is drawn
from the distribution prob(z = k|k)=ν > 1/2. This signal is positively correlated with
the good’s true quality because the signal is correct more than half of the time. Let this
signal be independent of the pricing decisions in the market and independent among the
buyers (given k). The buyer will buy the good if Prob(k =1 |z)+Prob(k = ρ|z)·ρ−p ≥ 0.
As long as ν < 1, the good is not a pure search good, because a buyer cannot discover the
18Alternatively, we could assume that the advertising cost is a function of the market tightness n and
solve for (D,n).
24quality of the good for sure before the purchase. Moreover, each seller’s payoﬀ depends on
quality k as well as p, since the quality aﬀects the signal which inﬂuences the probability
of a successful trade.
This extension enriches the basic framework in other ways too. In parameter regions
where asymmetric information considerations do not prevent the eﬃcient equilibrium to
arise (ρ < γ), this extension is not diﬀerent from the framework presented in the paper.
However, when private information problems prevent high-type sellers from posting their
“preferred” price, the market may be dominated by low-type sellers (case 2B in section
4.2), which occurs when ρ is high enough. In that case, because observable investment
and posted prices both direct buyers’ search, the parameter region where price posting by
high-type sellers is an equilibrium may be larger than in the baseline model.
We leave a more complete treatment of these extensions for future research.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced private information into a market with search frictions and
evaluated the relative eﬃciency of two pricing mechanisms, price posting and bargaining.
In contrast to other models that have introduced private information into search markets,
our model puts private information on the side of sellers so that sellers can use posted
prices to signal the quality of goods. This role of posted prices in signaling quality may
conﬂict with their role in directing buyers’ search. Focusing on this conﬂict, we found
that bargaining could yield higher eﬃciency than price posting, a result that reverses what
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) established for a se a r c hm a r k e tw i t hp u b l i ci n f o r m a t i o n .W e
characterized the parameter regions in which each mechanism dominates in eﬃciency.
In the model, sellers choose a costly investment in the quality of the good, which
remains private information until buyers visit the store. Sellers enter a search market
competitively and can choose either to post prices in one submarket or to bargain in
another submarket. With bargaining, private information does not aﬀect the allocation
because the quality is revealed prior to bargaining. In particular, bargaining induces sellers
to produce the eﬃc i e n tq u a l i t yo fg o o d s .B u tb a r g a i n e dp r i c e sd on o td i r e c tb u y e r s ’s e a r c h ,
and so they do not internalize search externalities. Posted prices direct search and, in the
case of public information, they internalize search externalities and generate constrained
eﬃciency. When the quality of a good is private information, posted prices both direct
search and signal the quality. If the diﬀerence between diﬀerent quality levels is large,
the two roles do not conﬂi c tw i t he a c ho t h e r ,i nw h i c hc a s ep r i c ep o s t i n gc o n t i n u e st ob e
25constrained eﬃcient. However, if the diﬀerence between diﬀerent quality levels is small, the
price level that internalizes search externalities is too low to be able to signal high quality.
In this case, the compromise between the two roles of posted prices can generate either
ineﬃcient entry of sellers and/or an ineﬃcient choice of quality. This ineﬃciency can make
price posting inferior to bargaining when sellers’ bargaining power is close to the so-called
Hosios condition.
We discussed several possible extensions of the model, including those that generate
coexistence of the two pricing mechanisms and that allow for buyers to receive quality
related signals. Another alley of research would be to apply the insights developed here to
other markets such as the labor market. As mentioned in the introduction, job amenities
would be a good example of the “quality” of a match that we examined. It might be
interesting to investigate across labor markets about a link between wage determination
and amenities or working conditions.
26Appendix
A. Proof of Result 2
Existence of the equilibrium described in Result 2 follows from the analysis leading to
(4.3). Note that (4.3) ensures that no seller will enter the market with low-quality goods
provided that some high-quality sellers will be present in the market. For uniqueness of
the equilibrium, it suﬃces to show that there is no equilibrium in which all sellers have
low quality. To do so, suppose that such an equilibrium exists. Then, a low-type seller will
post price p∗
L and will attract a queue length of buyers, q∗
L,w h e r ep∗
i = p∗ (ki)i sd e ﬁned
in (3.3) and q∗
i = q∗ (ki)i sd e ﬁn e di n( 3 . 2 ) . T h ee x p e c t e dv a l u et oav i s i t i n gb u y e ri s :
DL = ρ[F (q∗
L)+q∗
LF0 (q∗





L.S i n c e[ F(q)+qF0(q)] is a decreasing function, then
DL < ρ[F(q1)+q1F
0(q1)] = F(q0)(1 − ρ) < 1 − ρ,
where the equality follows from (4.2).
Given this value DL,i ti sp r o ﬁtable for a seller to enter the market with a high-quality
good and post price ρ.B yp o s t i n gp r i c eρ, this deviating seller can induce buyers to view
him (correctly) as a high-quality seller. Use q2 to denote the queue length of buyers whom
this seller will attract. Since the expected surplus to a buyer who visits the deviating seller















The solution, q2, is well-deﬁned because DL < 1 − ρ (see the above). The expected value
f o rt h i ss e l l e ri sq2F(q2)ρ. The entry of this seller is proﬁtable if q2F(q2) >a (1)/ρ.
Substituting a(1) from (4.1), we can rewrite the above condition as q2 >q 0, i.e., F(q2) <
F (q0). Using (A.1) to substitute F (q2) and using (4.2) to substitute F (q0), we can rewrite










That is, the deviation is proﬁtable if q∗
L >q 1.B e c a u s e−(q∗
L)
2 F0(q∗
L)=a(ρ)a n d[ −q2F0 (q)]
is an increasing function, then q∗
L >q 1 iﬀ (4.3) holds. Thus, under (4.3) and γ < ρ,t h e
equilibrium described in Result 2 is the only equilibrium. QED
B .P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 . 1
The text preceding Theorem 4.1 established most of the statements, except the result that
there exists ρ0 ∈ (γ,1) such that (4.3) holds if and only if ρ ∈ (γ,ρ0). To prove this result,










27This solves q0 as a function of ρ, which we denote as q0(ρ). The function q0(ρ)i sw e l l
deﬁned since [qF (q)] is strictly increasing between 0 and 1 and since ρ > γ.C l e a r l y ,
q0








Solve this equation for q1 as q1(ρ). (If equation (B.2) does not have a solution, set q1(ρ)=
0.) Then, (4.3) can be expressed as f(ρ) > 0, where
f(ρ) ≡ a(ρ)+[ q1(ρ)]
2 F
0(q1(ρ)).
Next, we show that f (γ) > 0a n df (1) < 0. To show f (γ) > 0, note that q0 (γ)=q∗
H.






















Because [F (q)+qF0 (q)] is decreasing, (B.2) implies q1 (γ) <q ∗
H. Hence,













The ﬁrst inequality follows from the result q1 (γ) <q ∗
H, the second inequality from a(γ) >
a(1), and the equality from (3.5). To show f (1) < 0, note that q0 (1) is bounded both
below and above, and so F (q0 (1)) ∈ (0,1). Then, (B.2) implies that F(q1)+q1F0(q1) → 0
as ρ → 1. This means q1 (ρ) → +∞ as ρ → 1, by part (iv) of Assumption 2. Clearly,
q1(1) >q ∗
H.W eh a v e :
f(1) = a(1) + [q1(1)]
2 F







Because f (ρ) is continuous, the two results, f (γ) > 0a n df (1) < 0, imply that there is
at least one such value ρ0 ∈ (γ,1) that satisﬁes f (ρ0)=0 .
Finally, we show that ρ0 is unique. Because f (γ) > 0a n df (1) < 0, uniqueness of ρ0
means that f (ρ) > 0 if and only if ρ ∈ (γ,ρ0), as stated in the theorem. For uniqueness
of ρ0,i ts u ﬃces to show that f0 (ρ0) < 0 whenever f (ρ0)=0a n dρ0 ∈ (γ,1). Note ﬁrst
that the function f0(ρ0)i sw e l ld e ﬁned as long as q1(ρ) > 0 and that it is straightforward
to verify that q1(ρ0) > 0. (ρ0 is the value of investment such that if high-quality sellers
play [k =1 ,q= q0,p= ρ0], then playing [k = ρ0,p 1,q 1] also earns zero proﬁt. However, if


















Because the derivative in [.] is negative, a suﬃcient condition for f0 (ρ0) < 0i sq0
1 (ρ0) > 0.
Examine the equation (B.2), for ρ = ρ0. Because the left-hand side of the equation is a
28decreasing function of q1,t h e nq0
1 (ρ0) > 0 if and only if the right-hand side of the equation





ρ[F (q0(ρ)) + q0(ρ)F0 (q0(ρ))]
.
Diﬀerentiate the right-hand side of (B.2) with respect to ρ, substitute the above result for
q0























We simplify this derivative. At ρ = ρ0,w eh a v e :
−[q1 (ρ0)]
2 F







The ﬁrst equality comes from f (ρ0)=0 ,t h eﬁrst inequality from ρ0 < 1, and the last
equality from (3.5) and the deﬁnition of γ.T h u s , q1 (ρ0) >q ∗
H. Also, (B.1) implies
q0 (ρ0) <q ∗
H, because ρ0 > γ.T h u s , q1 (ρ0) >q 0 (ρ0). Because [F (q)+qF0 (q)] is a
decreasing function, then [F (q)+qF0 (q)]q=q1(ρ0) < [F (q)+qF0 (q)]q=q0(ρ0). Substituting
this result and using (B.2) at ρ = ρ0 to replace (
1−ρ0


























The inequality follows from the fact that ρqF0 +F>q F 0 +F>0. Therefore, there exists
a unique ρ0 ∈ (γ,1) such that (4.3) is satisﬁed if and only if ρ ∈ (γ,ρ0). QED
C .P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 . 1
The ﬁrst part of theorem 5.1 summarizes the results of section 5. We prove below the
properties of s(ρ)a n dR(σ).
We start by showing that s0(ρ) < 0f o rγ ≤ ρ ≤ ρ0.D e n o t eb yQ(σ)t h eq u e u el e n g t h
in a bargaining equilibrium as a function of the sellers’ bargaining power. By deﬁnition of
s(ρ), W(1,q 0(ρ)) = W(1,Q(s(ρ) ) .U n d e rp a r t( b )o fc a s e2 A ,σ < γ,s ot h a ta n yq u e u es i z e
Q relevant for this case satisﬁes q0(ρ) <q ∗
H <Q .B yd e ﬁnition of q∗
H, the welfare function
W(1,q)i si n c r e a s i n gi nq for all q<q ∗
H.S i n c e q0(ρ) <q ∗
H and q0
0(ρ) < 0, W(1,q 0(ρ))
is a decreasing function of ρ. Therefore, so is W(1,Q(s(ρ))). Because Q>q ∗
H, however,
Q(s(ρ)) must be increasing in ρ and thus from (3.6), s0(ρ) < 0.
To show that s(γ)=γ.N o t i c e t h a t a t ρ = γ,p o s t i n g[ k =1 ,p = ρ = γ]i ss o c i a l l y
eﬃcient. We know that the bargaining equilibrium corresponds to the socially eﬃcient
allocation if and only if σ = γ.T h u s ,s(γ)=γ.
29By deﬁnition of R(σ), W(R(σ),q∗(R(σ))) = W(1,Q(σ)). It is immediate that R(σ) < 1
for σ 6= γ and that R(γ) = 1 since the bargaining equilibrium corresponds to the socially
eﬃcient allocation if and only if the Hosios condition applies.
To show that R0 (σ) > 0i ﬀ σ < γ, we notice that the function W(ρ,q ∗(ρ)) is strictly
increasing in ρ.W h e nσ < γ, an increase in sellers’ bargaining power improves eﬃciency
of the bargaining equilibrium and thus W(1,Q(σ)) increases, implying that R0(σ) > 0.
Similarly, R0(σ) < 0i fσ < γ.
W en o ws h o wt h a tR(ρ0)=ρ0 and that R(s(ρ0)) = ρ0. Combining (B.1) expressed at
ρ = ρ0 and (3.6) expressed at σ = ρ0, we obtain that Q(ρ0)=q0(ρ0). The function R(σ)
has been deﬁned as such that the welfare of the price posting equilibrium at ρ = R(σ)
is equal to that of the bargaining equilibrium with sellers’ bargaining power equal to σ.






We can rewrite the left-hand side of (C.1) as
LHS(C.1) = ρ0[F(q1 (ρ0)) + q1 (ρ0)F
0(q1 (ρ0))] = ρ0[F(q




The ﬁrst equality is obtained from writing (B.2) at ρ = ρ0, and the second equality from the
fact that f (ρ0) = 0. Since the function ρ[F(q∗ (ρ))+q∗ (ρ)F0(q∗ (ρ))] is strictly increasing,
it implies that R(ρ0)=ρ0.
By deﬁnition of s(ρ), s(ρ0)s a t i s ﬁes W(1,Q(s(ρ0)) = W(1,q 0(ρ0)). By deﬁnition
of R(σ), W(1,Q(s(ρ0)) = W(R(s(ρ0)),q∗(R(s(ρ0)))). Since f(ρ0) = 0, it implies that
q1 (ρ0)=q∗(ρ0). Finally, expressing (B.2) at ρ = ρ0 and recognizing equality of welfare
and surplus, we obtain that W(ρ0,q ∗(ρ0)) = W(1,q 0(ρ0)). Since the function W(ρ,q ∗(ρ))
is strictly increasing in ρ, it follows that R(s(ρ0)) = ρ0.Q E D
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